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State and county government agencies in all 50 states have adopted farmland preservation 
programs, and over 35 state and local governments actively engage in preservation through 
purchase or transfer of development rights (PDR and TDR) programs.  These programs rely on 
voluntary participation and pay landowners for development rights that are permanently 
separated from the land.
1 
Individual preservation and development decisions occur amidst changing conditions in 
land markets and in the context of changing land use patterns.  Farmland preservation programs 
are typically implemented on the fringes of developed areas, in areas experiencing the greatest 
suburbanization and the greatest growth in population and/or incomes.  These growth pressures 
almost inevitably lead to rapid increases in the development value of agricultural land.  When 
growth pressures are strong enough, development values of land can significantly exceed the 
agricultural use value.  This can preclude new farmers from entering the industry due to the high 
acquisition cost of land, leaving development as the only viable land use option when farm 
ownership turns over. In the absence of farmland preservation programs, the relevant land use 
question in these areas often is not whether a landowner develops, but when.   
Farmland preservation programs that pay landowners for development rights that are 
permanently separated from the land offer landowners an alternative to development.  In addition 
to considering the gains from developing at the optimal time, landowners facing this preservation 
alternative can also consider the gains from preserving at the optimal time.  Farmland 
preservation programs change the nature of the landowner’s land use decision from simply an 
optimal timing of development decision, to one that has two components:  decisions about the 
optimal timing of development and preservation, and a discrete choice between these two land 
use alternatives. 
Existing empirical studies that model participation in PDR and TDR programs have 
treated the preservation decision as a binary discrete choice problem (Bockstael and Bell 1997; 
                                                                 
1 Once the landowner sells the development rights associated with a farm parcel, that parcel is restricted 
from being converted to developed uses by the current and all future landowners.  Even when development rights 
have been sold, the landowner retains ownership and remaining rights in the land.      
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Pitt, Lessley and Phipps 1988; Pitt, Phipps and Lessley 1988).  These studies ignore that 
development constitutes a competing land use alternative and do not reveal any information 
about factors that affect the optimal timing of a landowner’s preservation decision.  Nor do they 
account for the effect of preservation agency priorities on preservation decisions.  The goal of the 
current paper is to compare two alternative approaches to empirically modeling landowners’ 
decisions to participate in PDR/TDR programs that can explicitly account for multiple 
alternatives and the dynamic nature of the decision process:  a multinomial logit model and a 
Cox (proportional hazards) model.  These empirical approaches stem from two different views of 
how landowners make land use decisions in the absence of perfect foresight, and both have 
potential limitations.  In doing so we investigate how a number of factors influence a 
landowner’s decision to preserve farmland, including the value of land in alternative uses and  
parcel characteristics that factor into preservation agencies’ priorities when funds must be 
rationed.  With the exception of one variable, we do not include measures that are specific to the 
landowner himself, as this type of data is rarely available. 
State and local governments are increasingly adopting PDR or TDR programs with the 
goal of preserving as much land as possible before landowners find it optimal to develop.  As a 
result, understanding the factors that influence a landowner’s voluntary decision to preserve – in 
the context of competing choices for land uses – is becoming more important to policymakers.  
The policy advantage of the approaches we employ is that they attempt to reveal what motivates 
landowners to preserve their land, using data that policymakers have readily available.  These 
approaches also avoid the costs and other difficulties of obtaining survey data sufficient to 
answer such questions.  The drawback is that idiosyncratic factors that affect landowners’ 
decisions is excluded from the models.   Their absence induces a random distribution of 





The following empirical models are based on general theoretical models of the 
landowner’s decisions regarding preservation and development, in which landowners are 
assumed to be utility maximizers.  Landowners are assumed to derive utility from net worth – the      
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most significant component of which is the value of land.  In addition to the value of land in an 
agricultural use and in a developed use, landowners considering development are assumed to 
derive utility from owning farmland – because they derive utility either from farming as an 
occupation or from holding farmland.  The latter may be true if the land has been in the family 
for a long time or has particular recreational value to the owner.  Landowners considering 
preservation are assumed to derive utility from avoiding farm debt. Previous studies have 
suggested that debt management is an important issue for farmers and motivates them to preserve 
farmland (Pitt, Lessley and Phipps 1988; Perry and Johnson 1996; and Maynard et al. 1998).  
With perfect foresight, a landowner would consider the optimal time to preserve as well as the 
optimal time to develop, and in the present period would make a discrete choice between the two 
time paths.  Perfect foresight is not realistic, though, because decision makers cannot perfectly 
anticipate future conditions.  In what follows, we describe two alternative ways of modeling this 
decision process in the absence of perfect foresight. 
 
Discrete Choice Model 
In the absence of perfect foresight, a landowner will form expectations about the value of 
his land in alternative uses and will continually update these expectations.  One approach to 
modeling this dynamic decision process is to treat the observation period as one decision period, 
in which the landowner makes a discrete decision among the alternatives: preserve, develop or 
postpone the land use decision.  In this model a landowner chooses to preserve when preserving 
in this decision period yields utility that equals or exceeds 1) the utility from developing in this 
decision period, and 2) the discounted expected utility of delaying the land use decision (thereby 
retaining options in the future).   
The empirical counterpart to this model of the landowner’s decision process is a discrete 
choice model which allows for three alternatives: preservation, development, or postponement of 
the decision beyond the observable time horizon.  The net expected utility from choosing any 
particular alternative will not be completely observable to the researcher; if the unobservable 
portion has an underlying logistic distribution, the probability landowner i chooses alternative j, 
Pij, is defined as: 
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where Pij is normalized on the K
th alternative, wi is a vector of explanatory variables, and a is an 
associated vector of parameters.  The vector wi includes parcel characteristics that can be 
expected to affect agricultural returns (percent of cropland with prime soils)) and returns in 
development (commuting distance to employment centers and the percent of the parcel that is 
forested).   
The easement payment can not be directly measured for all landowners, because it is not 
observed when the landowner does not preserve his land.  However, since preservation agencies 
will estimate the easement value as some function of the agricultural use value and the 
development value of the parcel, the parcel characteristics used to measure agricultural and 
development returns will also affect the easement payment.  Other important factors affecting the 
easement payment are agency preferences for parcels with particular characteristics; e.g., the size 
of the parcel, and its proximity to other preserved parcels.  These parcel characteristics are 
included in w as are indicator variables capturing differences among preservation programs 
(agricultural district requirements, whether the State program is the only preservation option, and 
eligibility for bonuses).  wi also includes a measure of the length of parcel ownership (own£3yr).  
This is included to capture differences in debt circumstances, since individuals who have 
recently purchased or inherited agricultural land may find themselves in a more untenable debt 
position than others and may be more likely to preserve sooner as a result.  In terms of the 
development decision, a recent purchase may be an explanation of earlier development if the 
buyer bought the parcel with the intent to develop but rented out the land to farmers in the 
interim.   
In this application K=3; the alternatives are preservation, development and postponent.  The 
alternative of waiting to make the land use decision is chosen as the normalized alternative,K, 
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Parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood.  The likelihood function is the product of the 
N  landowner contributions and is specified as: 











where yij equals 1 if landowner i chooses alternative j and 0 otherwise.  
 
Cox (Proportional Hazards) Model 
The second approach we employed to modeling preservation behavior is to assume 
landowners update expectations in each period and ultimately choose the “terminal state” 
alternative (preservation or development) whose optimal transition time arrives first. In each 
period, a landowner is viewed as making two separate decisions.  In the first decision, he 
compares the utility he could earn from preserving in the current period to the expected utility he 
could earn by postponing the decision to preserve.  He makes a similar decision about 
developing, comparing the gains from developing today to delaying the decision for a period.  If 
it is not optimal to preserve or to develop in the current period, the landowner waits, updates his 
expectations, and again makes the two decisions in the next period.  If it is optimal to choose 
either path in the current period, the landowner takes that irreversible action and the decision 
process ends.  For this approach a Cox (proportional hazards) competing risks model is 
estimated.  This approach assumes that a landowner will choose the alternative whose optimal 
transition time arrives first. 
  Duration analysis is useful for studying the occurrence and timing of events.  The basic 
duration model treats all transitions as if they are identical, and does not allow the researcher to 
distinguish between alternative destination states.  The method of competing risks is an extension 
of this basic duration model and permits a researcher to treat multiple destination states (i.e., 
types of transitions) differently and to estimate type-specific risks separately.  It has been used to 
study a variety of issues, such as employment spells (Burdett et al. 1995), commodity brand 
switching behavior (Gonul and Srinivasan 1993, Gould 1998) and, recently, land use changes 
(Nickerson, 2000; Hite et al. 2000). 
The competing risks approach assumes each destination state has a mechanism that 
governs both the occurrence and timing of the transition.  Let Z1, …,ZJ be the J independent      
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random variables representing the durations for J destinations.  The competing risks approach 
assumes that the actual destination state that is entered is determined by whichever Zj is the 
smallest, and that it is this duration that is observed (Lancaster).   
In our problem, J=2 as there are two terminal states.  Letting eij represent the 
unobservable characteristics associated with a landowner’s decision, define eij
* (j=1,2) . as the eij 
of the landowner who is just indifferent between a transition of type j and no transition of type j.  
Conditioned on explanatory variables, the probability that a landowner will choose a transition of 
type j at time t is the hazard rate for type j in period t, and is given by: 
 
(4.4)  ( )
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where  ( ) ￿ F  is the cumulative distribution function for eij and V
j is land value under the jth 
alternative.  The conditional probability in equation (4.4) is the probability that a transition 
occurs between t and t+1, and that the type of transition is j, given that the landowner had not 
already developed or preserved his parcel by time t.  The overall hazard of a land use transition is 
the sum of the type-specific hazards,  ( ) ( ) ￿ =
j
ij i t h t h . 
The proportional hazards model (also known as a Cox model) forms the basis of the 
competing risks model.  This type of model is useful for providing information about the effect 
of explanatory variables on the timing of the decision, and it handles time-varying explanatory 
variables well.  In the Cox model the hazard rate associated with hazard type j for individual i is 
specified as: 
 
(4.5)  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] j i j i ij t w t t w t h b l exp ) ( ; 0 = ,   j=1,…J, 
 
where l0j(t) is a baseline hazard at time t, wi is the vector of explanatory variables, and bj  is a 
corresponding vector of parameters.  The parameter vector b is subscripted by j to denote that the 
effects of the parameters may differ for each type of transition.  In fact, some elements of wi may      
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affect only one type of hazard and not another, implying that some elements of bj may be equal 
to zero.   
In estimating the hazard of preservation, parcel characteristics in the vector wi that help 
explain the order of transitions are those that affect the easement payment.  Also included is a 
measure to capture changes in demand in the land market, which will affect expectations of 
changes in development returns and easement values (changes in the number of housing starts).  
Other characteristics included are ones that measure government preferences for particular 
parcels, differences between preservation programs, and the length of ownership as a measure of 
different debt circumstances.  For the hazard of development, parcel characteristics in wi with 
expected nonzero parameters are those measuring agricultural returns, returns to development, 
and expectations on changes in those returns.  l0j(t) can also vary across transition types.  l0j(t) is 
viewed as a function of time only, common to all landowners at risk of the j
th transition, and 
controls the rate of transitions.  In the context of the land transition problem, one could think of 
l0j(t) as being a function of economic conditions that affect all parcels equally; e.g., interest 
rates, growth pressures, or development fees.   
The parameters of the Cox model are estimated by maximizing the log of the partial 
likelihood function which does not contain the baseline hazards.
2  Unlike most applications of 
maximum likelihood, each observation in the data set does not necessarily make a contribution to 
the likelihood function in the Cox model; the ones that do not are those that are not observed to 
make a transition during the period of observation.  Information about these observations, 
however, appear in the denominator of each likelihood contribution. The duration model 
literature refers to these observations as “censored.”  The i
th landowner’s contribution to the 
likelihood function is given by: 
   
(4.6) 
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2 The Cox model is called a proportional hazards model because the j
th hazard for any landowner is a fixed 
proportion of the j
th hazard for any other landowner.  Because the baseline hazard l0(t) cancels out, the ratio of the 
hazards remains constant over time.      
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This is the probability that parcel i experiences transition given thte set of parcels at risk at time ti 
and given the fact that a transition takes place at time ti. In the above expression,  M(ti) is the set 
of parcels still “at risk” of transition at time ti.  M(ti) will not include parcels that have moved 
into the terminal state before ti.   





is the number of parcels that make the transition in the observation period.   Assuming that 
exactly one transition occurs at each event time, the likelihood function is given by: 
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Note that the partial likelihood function, PL(b), will depend only on the order of the transitions 
and not on the precise time of them.  In order to learn about the rate at which transitions take 
place, the baseline hazard would also need to be estimated.   
In competing risks analysis, more than one terminal state exists.  Each hazard is treated 
independently, however.  The partial likelihood function for all transitions taken together is the 
product of the likelihood functions for each type of transition.  The only adjustment occurs in the 
relevant risk sets at each point in time.  The set at risk for hazard j at time ti is now all those 
parcels that have not already succumbed to either of the potential hazards.  In this application, 
the set at risk for preservation at time ti will be all parcels that have not already been either 
preserved or developed by period ti. The expression for the partial likelihood of all transitions 
taken together, assuming exactly one transition occurs at each time event is:  
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where  j N
~
 is the number of transitions to the j
th terminal state and J is the number of terminal 
states.  Again, the partial likelihood function does not include the baseline hazard rates, the 
l0j(t),which control the rate of transitions, so estimating the model does not reveal information 
about whether the hazard rate  is increasing, decreasing or constant over time.  The partial 
likelihood function depends only on the ordering of the transitions, and the explanatory variables      
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help explain the order of the transitions.  If the eij’s are independent, the partial likelihood 
function in equation (4.8) can be factored into separate likelihood functions for each transition 
type.  This is the usual procedure for estimating the competing risks model and allows the hazard 
function parameters for each type of transition to be estimated separately. 
 
Summary of differences in modeling approaches 
  The discrete choice and competing risks approaches differ in their implications for 
landowner behavior, and also in what the methods allow the researcher to capture in estimation.  
Landowners make preservation and development decisions in the face of development pressures 
and easement payments that increase over time, as well as  county priorities that change from 
year to year.  The decision modeled is whether the landowner, during the observation period, 
chooses to preserve or develop or whether he postpones these decisions until some later time that 
is not observable to the researcher.  The drawback is that the discrete choice approach is a static 
one that does not allow the researcher to model how these changing circumstances affect the 
probability of preservation or development.  On the other hand, this is one of the strengths of the 
competing risks approach.  The latter method allows a researcher to introduce these differing 
circumstances into the model and to identify how these changes influence the risk of preservation 
and development.  A possible drawback is that the implicit assumption embedded in the 
competing risks model is that the landowner chooses between preservation and development 
based on whether the optimal preservation time or the optimal development time is encountered 
first.  Another limitation of the competing risks approach is that it requires the eij’s to be 
independent.  That is, conditioned on explanatory variables, landowners who are at particularly 
high (or low) risk of one type of transition must be no more or less likely to experience any other 
type of transition.  In the context of development and preservation decisions, the unobserved 
attributes that were described as giving rise to the respective eij’s are expected to be different. 
However, factors common to both errors can not be ruled out a priori.  
 
A Case Study in Maryland 
  Four urbanizing counties in central Maryland comprise the study area: Carroll, Frederick, 
Calvert, and Howard.  The State of Maryland operates a PDR program, in which landowners in 
all counties can enroll.  Calvert and Howard Counties also operate distinct county PDR and      
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county TDR programs.  Although multiple preservation options exist in these two counties, 
landowners in these counties consistently chose to participate in the county programs rather than 
the State program during the study period.  Carroll and Frederick Counties have “critical farms” 
programs that advance easement funds to farmers buying unpreserved farmland who wish to 
preserve the land, but preservation ultimately occurs through the State’s PDR program.  Table 1 
depicts summary statistics on preserved parcels in these preservation programs.   
The data used in estimation consists of all parcels that were at risk of both preservation 
and development during the period 1993 through 1997 in these four counties.  Parcels excluded 
from the dataset, a priori, were those that were identified as having been preserved or developed 
prior to 1993, parcels identified as parkland or other similarly protected areas, and parcels that 
will remain undeveloped due to required clustering regulations.  Using the Maryland Division of 
Assessments and Taxation (DAT) database and additional data on land use and zoning, the data 
set was further circumscribed to include only those parcels that met the minimum requirements 
for participation in a preservation program (i.e., parcels located outside planned water and sewer 
service boundaries, parcels in certain zoning districts, and parcels that met minimum soil quality 
and size standards).  Consistent with program eligibility criteria, parcels smaller than the 
minimum acreage requirements for participation (in Carroll, Frederick and Howard parcels must 
be at least 100 acres in size, and in Calvert the minimum is 50 acres) were included only if 
located adjacent to an already preserved parcel.  Depending on the zoning district, the parcels at 
risk included those with at least 10 acres in Calvert County, approximately 20 acres in Carroll 
County and 25 acres in Howard and Frederick Counties.  A total of 1,680 parcels were identified 
as being at risk of preservation and development during the five year study period.   
Data on preserved parcels were provided by county and state preservation agencies and 
linked to the DAT database.  All parcels were then linked to Geographic Information System 
(GIS) data available from the Maryland Office of Planning, including data such as soil types, 
zoning, public utilities, and distances to various features in the landscape.  A parcel was 
considered to have been converted to developed uses if it was subdivided into at least four pieces 
during the study period and it no longer qualified for preservation.
3  Four housing lots was 
                                                                 
3 This rule of thumb prevented coding as developed those large farm parcels which subdivided to create, for 
example, four to six house lots on the perimeter of the parent parcel, but which still retained a sufficient amount of 
land in agriculture to qualify for preservation. 
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chosen as the rule to identify parcels experiencing commercial-scale development.  Using these 
definitions, 97 parcels were preserved and 45 were developed during the study period (Table 2).
4 
 
Definition of Explanatory Variables 
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in estimation are reported in Table 3.  
Almost all of the same variables are used in estimating both the discrete choice and the 
competing risks models.  However, the two variables that vary over time are measured 
differently in the two models:  the variables measuring length of ownership, OWN£ 3YR, and 
distance to the nearest preserved farm, DISTPRES.  One of the principal advantages of using a 
Cox model is that it allows a researcher to readily incorporate variables that change in value over 
the course of the study period.  In the discrete choice model, (OWN£ 3YR) is equal to one if the 
parcel was owned three years or less as of 1993 and zero otherwise.  In the Cox model, the 
length of ownership is measured such that OWN￿3YR will equal one from 1991 through 1993 
for any parcel purchased  in 1991 will equal zero in 1994-1997.  If a parcel is sold during the 
study period, the value of OWN￿3YR is reset to one in the year of sale.    
The distance to the nearest preserved farm will also take on different values during the 
study period, as closer parcels become preserved.  The value of DISTPRES is updated 
accordingly each year in the Cox model.  Smaller distances to other preserved farms are expected 
to induce earlier preservation, at least in the three counties (Calvert, Carroll and Frederick) that 
specifically prioritize purchasing development rights from these parcels first.  
Because the Cox model can incorporate time-varying covariates, the competing risks 
approximation to the decision making process also allows the researcher to assess how the 
dynamics of local economic conditions and regulations affect the expectations of changes in 
returns to development and changes in easement values.  Overall growth pressure in the region 
cannot be captured, as these effects appear in the baseline hazard whose parameters cannot be 
easily estimated.  However, variations in growth pressure and in stringency of growth controls 
across counties can be proxied.  The variable ÄNEWHOMES is derived from the Bureau of 
Census data on single family housing starts by county and is included in the competing risks 
                                                                 
4 Note: Administrative delays caused by adoption of a new system for handling preservation applications in 
Howard County prevented preservation of properties in 1993 in that county.  Also, Howard County’s PDR program 
terminated at the end of 1996. 
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models..  The four counties in the study area differ in the rates of growth in population and 
incomes they are experiencing, as well as in regulatory constraints, so the coefficients on this 
variable are allowed to vary by county.  Descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in 
estimation are reported in Table 3. 
 
Results – Comparison Across Models 
The multinomial logit model allows a researcher to estimate decisions with multiple 
alternatives in a static framework, while the competing risks model reveals more about the 
timing of the decision process.  In this section, we compare the results from modeling the 
landowner’s preservation decision in these two frameworks.  The results from maximum 
likelihood estimation of the multinomial logit model are reported in Tables 4.  In Table 5 are the 
results from estimating the hazard of preservation in the Cox model.  We do not include results 
from modeling the development decision in the Cox model, because the paucity of parcels in the 
dataset that were developed makes it difficult to draw conclusions about influences on the 
development decision.  However, the preservation decision estimation takes account of the 
developed parcels by adjusting the set of parcels at risk from one time period to the next. 
Whether the landowner’s preservation decision is estimated using a multinomial logit or a 
competing risks approach, the proxies for agricultural returns and net returns to development 
appear to affect preservation decisions similarly.  Where these measures increase the odds of 
preservation relative to waiting in the multinomial logit model, they bring forward the expected 
time to preservation in the competing risks model.  Both models provide evidence a) that the 
State program appears to be successful in preserving the most productive farmland first in 
Carroll and Frederick Counties, and b) that commuting costs, one proxy for development returns, 
affect the timing of preservation decisions, nonlinearly.  The probability of preservation (vs. 
postponing) decreases with commuting distance, and the turning points in the quadratics of both 
models are similar (approximately 33 and 50 miles in Carroll and Frederick, respectively).  Both 
models also indicate that the Calvert parcels most likely to be preserved (relative to postponing) 
are those with the least productive land.  In Calvert County, the TDR program is the primary 
preservation mechanism, and in such a program developers buy development rights without 
regard to parcel characteristics.      
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The effects of length of ownership (an indicator of debt circumstances) and agency 
preferences for preserving farms in clusters differs somewhat between the models.  This is 
perhaps not surprising, since these two measures are time varying but cannot be treated as such 
in the multinomial logit model.  The results imply that when the length of ownership is 
appropriately measured as a time varying covariate in the competing risks model, this measure of 
debt circumstances significantly increases the odds of preservation relative to postponing a 
decision in every county but Howard.  Given the structure of the various preservation 
mechanisms, these preferences are expected to be at least as significant in Howard as they are in 
Carroll and Frederick Counties.  Wald tests of the equality of the coefficients on the length of 
ownership variable provide some evidence that behavior is not significantly different across 
these three counties.  In Frederick and Carroll Counties, the increase in significance of this 
variable when the decision is estimated in a competing risks vs. the multinomial logit model 
could be due to its more accurate measurement.  An additional explanation for its significance is 
the influence of Carroll and Frederick Counties’ critical farms programs, which allow 
preservation to occur sooner for new farm owners. The significance of the effect of agency 
preferences for preserving farms in clusters is also greater when the preservation decision is 
modeled in the competing risks framework as opposed to the multinomial logit model, and again 
because the relevant variable is measured more accurately.  In the two counties that prioritize 
preserving in clusters, the expected time to preservation is sooner for parcels near already 
preserved farmland.  The multinomial logit model provides only limited evidence that this 
agency preference can affect preservation probabilities, and only in Calvert County.    
In addition to preferring preserving parcels in clusters, the programs in all four counties 
also prioritize purchasing development rights from larger farms first.  This additional priority 
given to large farms is shown to affect preservation probabilities in Howard County in both 
models, but not in the other three counties.  Nor does the requirement in some counties that 
parcels be enrolled in an agricultural district prior to preservation.  Though this latter result 
implies that an extra set of requirements may not adversely affect preservation decisions (which 
may be encouraging for preservation agencies), the result could merely reflect that the county in 
which such a requirement would be the most costly (Howard County) does not have the district 
requirement for that reason.  A more cautious interpretation of the insignificance on the      
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coefficient on AGDISTRICT is that district status may not be a good signal that landowners 
ultimately preserve. 
Also, the results indicate that a county’s reliance solely on the State preservation program 
does not appear to adversely affect preservation decisions in either model.  The incentive bonus 
offered in Carroll County, though, increases the likelihood preservation will occur sooner for 
Carroll landowners who qualify for it. 
Because the competing risks model can accommodate time varying covariates, it allows 
testing of the effect of changes in expectations (as signaled by ÄNEWHOMES) on development 
returns (and thus easement values) on the preservation decision.  The preservation decisions of 
Carroll County landowners are affected by these changes, but the effect was not strong.  That an 
effect was apparent in Carroll but not the other counties could be attributed to the longer 
consistent trend in changes in housing starts in that county.    
 
Summary 
Even though the competing risks and multinomial logit models are intended to mimic 
different theoretical approximations to the land use decision process, the empirical results from 
estimating these models are quite similar, perhaps because of the importance the censored 
observations take on in this empirical exercise.  Where the explanatory variables increase the 
odds of preservation or development relative to waiting in the multinomial logit model, they 
bring forward the expected time of preservation or development in the competing risks model.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the differences between the models are limited to the variables that 
capture the changing context of the decision.  While these variables are necessarily measured at 
one point in time in the multinomial logit model, they are allowed to vary over time in the 
competing risks model.  Also, the competing risks model provides evidence that the effects of 
changes in expectations of development returns over time (and thus easement values) can affect 
preservation and development decisions; these effects are not as readily measured in the 
multinomial logit model.  The competing risks model introduces more information (in terms of 
the ordering of decisions) and more accuracy in the measurement of time varying variables. As 
such, it may better capture the factors that influence preservation decisions. 
The results from estimating the effects on preservation decisions suggest that 
preservation programs can affect the spatial pattern of preserved land.  Amongst the eligible      
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parcels in Carroll and Frederick Counties, which are preserved through Maryland’s State PDR 
program, parcels are more likely to be preserved than to have the decision postponed the closer 
they are to major employment centers.  In Carroll and Calvert Counties, the closer a parcel is to 
other preserved parcels the more likely it is to be preserved (vs. having the decision postponed).  
Neither of these effects are evident in Howard County.  The resulting spatial pattern of preserved 
farmland could have implications for the extent to which the public is willing to support 
allocations of tax dollars to farmland preservation programs.   
Although information on the public’s preferences regarding farmland preservation is not 
available for Maryland, surveys have been conducted in other states.  In a survey of Rhode Island 
residents, Kline and Wichelns (1996) found that respondents gave considerable importance to 
environmental objectives, including protecting groundwater resources, wildlife habitat, and 
natural places, and to aesthetic objectives, such as preserving rural character and scenic quality.  
Access to local fresh produce was also important, as was slowing development.  Preserving large 
blocks of open space might best satisfy several of these objectives, but the desirability for close 
proximity to preserved land is unclear.  If Maryland and Rhode Island residents have similar 
priorities, then the State program and Calvert County’s programs preserve land in a manner 
consistent with at least some of the public’s preferences for preserving farmland.  This research 
should be a useful first step in addressing broader questions about the effects of preservation 
programs on spatial patterns of land uses.  
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Table 1.  Acres of Preserved Farmland in Study Area as of June 30, 1997 
  Carroll  Frederick  Calvert  Howard 
Acres preserved through State 
program 
25,591  10,062  3,455  3,956 
Acres preserved through County 
programs 
--  354  7,630  13,470 
% of county land preserved  8.9%  2.5%  8.0%  10.8% 




Table 2.  Number of Preserved and Developed Parcels 
  Year preserved or developed   












Preserved parcels  15  26  22  15  19  97 
             
Developed parcels  4  9  8  10  14  45 
             
Parcels remaining in 
agriculture at end of 
study 
           
1,538 
             
Total parcels in 
dataset 
          1,680 
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics (N=1,680)  
 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Ca*cropprime  Equal to %cropland, for Calvert 









Ho*cropprime  Equal to %cropland, for Howard 
parcels with prime soils 
 







Cr*cropprime  Equal to %cropland, for Carroll 
parcels with prime soils 
 







Fr*cropprime  Equal to %cropland, for Fred-









Ca*acres  Calvert*acres in parcel  10.85187  34.35457  0  402.30000 
Ho*acres  Howard*acres in parcel  10.19796  61.76108  0  2042.28 
Cr*acres  Carroll*acres in parcel  29.40312  58.95116  0  393.42000 
Fr*acres  Frederick*acres in parcel  71.07968  81.46977  0  566.59000 
Ca*commuteDC  Calvert*commute to Washington 
  D.C. along roads network, in   









Ho*commuteDC  Howard*commute to Washing-   
  ton D.C. along roads network,  









Cr*commuteBa  Carroll*commute to Baltimore   









Fr*commuteDC  Frederick*commute to Washing-   
  ton D.C. along roads network,  










2  308.59076  746.54832  0  3596.88 
Ho*commuteDC2  Howard*(commuteDC)
2  99.44535  329.66786  0  1745.57 
Cr*commuteBa2  Carroll*(commuteBa)
2  339.22894  647.63520  0  2722.86 
Fr*commuteDC2  Frederick*(commuteDC)
2  1502.63  1631.91  0  5345.80 
Numlots  Number of house lots allowed  11.70991  29.51556  2.10600  680.76000 
Numlots2  (Number of house lots allowed)
2  1007.77  13248.04  4.43524  463434.18 
Poorbuild  Equal to 1 if house construction 









Pctforest  Percent of parcel in forest  0.19283  0.23589  0  1 
Ca*(own£3yr)  Equal to 1 if Calvert parcel 









Ho*(own£3yr)  Equal to 1 if Howard parcel 









Cr*(own£3yr)  Equal to 1 if Carroll parcel 









Fr*(own£3yr)  Equal to 1 if Frederick parcel 









Ca*distpres  Calvert*distance to nearest 









Ho*distpres  Howard*distance to nearest 







       
9695.59 
Cr*distpres  Carroll*distance to nearest 









Fr*distpres  Frederick*distance to nearest 









Agdistrict  Equal to one if parcel’s county  
requires agricultural district 








1      
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics, continued 
 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Stateonly  Equal to one if only the State 
PDR program is a preservation 









Crbonus  Equal to one if Carroll parcel 
was eligible to receive incentive 









Ca*(Dnewhomes)  Calvert*change in annual                                  









Ho*(Dnewhomes)  Howard*change in annual                                  









Cr*(Dnewhomes)  Carroll*change in annual                                  








     0.32572 
 
Fr*(Dnewhomes)  Frederick*change in annual                                  










Note:  The time-varying variables (own£3yr, distpres, Dnewhomes) are reported for the first year 
of the study period.  
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  Table 4.  Results from Multinomial Choice Model – 
                Log Odds of Preservation Relative to Waiting   
                (N=1,680)       
        
    Parameter Standard    Prob |t| 
 Variable  Estimate Error  t-ratio  >= x 
 Constant       -34.63122 27.227  -1.272  0.20339 
*  Ca*cropprime   -1.683699 0.98558  -1.708  0.08758 
 Ho*cropprime   1.176003 0.94979  1.238  0.21565 
**  Cr*cropprime   1.098849 0.55922  1.965  0.04942 
*   Fr*cropprime   1.005051 0.52987  1.897  0.05786 
 Ca*commuteDC    -0.4235449 0.34503  -1.228  0.21961 
 Ho*commuteDC    1.693369 1.5938  1.063  0.28801 
**  Cr*commuteBa   -0.609221 0.25684  -2.372  0.01769 
**  Fr*commuteDC   -0.3650562 0.17109  -2.134  0.03286 
 Ca*commuteDC2   4.71E-03 3.94E-03  1.197  0.23144 
 Ho*commuteDC2   -2.27E-02 2.33E-02  -0.975  0.32944 
**  Cr*commuteBa2  9.44E-03 3.52E-03  2.681  0.00734 
**  Fr*commuteDC2  3.70E-03 1.58E-03  2.34  0.01926 
 Ca*pctforest    -0.8241648 0.92235  -0.894  0.37156 
 Ho*pctforest    -0.2571128 2.114  -0.122  0.9032 
 Cr*pctforest    -0.6421278 1.3196  -0.487  0.62655 
 Fr*pctforest    -3.553019 2.3975  -1.482  0.13835 
*   Ca*(own<=3yr)   0.992578 0.5408  1.835  0.06645 
**  Ho*(own<=3yr)   1.797828 0.68864  2.611  0.00904 
**  Cr*(own<=3yr)   0.9036933 0.42684  2.117  0.03424 
 Fr*(own<=3yr)   0.5832862 0.40729  1.432  0.15211 
 Ca*acres       5.18E-03 4.12E-03  1.257  0.20871 
**  Ho*acres       7.54E-03 3.59E-03  2.101  0.03568 
 Cr*acres       -1.38E-03 3.52E-03  -0.393  0.69445 
 Fr*acres       -5.24E-03 4.02E-03  -1.306  0.19168 
*   Ca*distpres    -4.89E-04 2.76E-04  -1.776  0.0757 
 Ho*distpres    -5.73E-04 8.87E-04  -0.646  0.51798 
 Cr*distpres    -1.12E-04 2.04E-04  -0.548  0.58343 
 Fr*distpres    -5.74E-05 1.06E-04  -0.542  0.58798 
 Agdistrict     42.19431 28.223  1.495  0.13491 
 Stateonly      -1.858423 8.7688  -0.212  0.83216 
**  Crbonus        2.500341 0.40675  6.147  0 
         
 log L -451.5550       
 **significant at 5% level       
  *significant at 10% level       
      
  20
 
  Table 5.  Results from Competing Risks Cox Model –  
                Hazard of Preservation   
           (N=1,680)       
         
    Parameter Standard  Wald  Prob > 
 Variable  Estimate Error  Chi-sq  Chi-sq 
*   Ca*cropprime   -1.670554 0.94011  3.15763  0.0756 
    Ho*cropprime   1.016652 0.83921  1.46758  0.2257 
**  Cr*cropprime   1.285123 0.47366  7.36122  0.0067 
**  Fr*cropprime   1.048374 0.51523  4.14024  0.0419 
    Ca*commuteDC    -0.34229 0.32229  1.12793  0.2882 
    Ho*commuteDC    0.98757 1.38062  0.51167  0.4744 
**  Cr*commuteBa   -0.808281 0.20472  15.5892  0.0001 
**  Fr*commuteDC   -0.526975 0.14003  14.16241  0.0002 
    Ca*commuteDC2   0.003825 0.00367  1.08531  0.2975 
    Ho*commuteDC2   -0.013115 0.02036  0.41497  0.5195 
**  Cr*commuteBa2  0.01186 0.00278  18.22492  0.0001 
**  Fr*commuteDC2  0.005158 0.00131  15.60312  0.0001 
    Ca*pctforest    -0.989708 0.84509  1.37155  0.2415 
    Ho*pctforest    -0.350081 1.795  0.03804  0.8454 
    Cr*pctforest    0.361626 1.14618  0.09954  0.7524 
    Fr*pctforest    -3.458848 2.33505  2.19418  0.1385 
**  Ca*(own<=3yr)   1.385531 0.51769  7.16308  0.0074 
    Ho*(own<=3yr)   1.10385 0.70964  2.41958  0.1198 
**  Cr*(own<=3yr)   1.277558 0.36959  11.94889  0.0005 
**  Fr*(own<=3yr)   0.96439 0.42324  5.19191  0.0227 
    Ca*acres       0.005947 0.00391  2.30975  0.1286 
**  Ho*acres       0.001911 0.00075  6.43876  0.0112 
    Cr*acres       0.000006464 0.00285  5.15E-06  0.9982 
    Fr*acres       -0.004696 0.00389  1.4609  0.2268 
*   Ca*distpres    -0.000811 0.00044  3.45062  0.0632 
    Ho*distpres    -0.000402 0.0007  0.32689  0.5675 
**  Cr*distpres    -0.001181 0.00036  10.67582  0.0011 
    Fr*distpres    -0.000185 0.00012  2.56177  0.1095 
    Agdistrict     26.698157 24.2911  1.208  0.2717 
    Stateonly      4.264358 7.88884  0.2922  0.5888 
**  Crbonus        2.387112 0.36066  43.80724  0.0001 
    Ca*(newhomes)   3.521146 3.13345  1.26276  0.2611 
    Ho*(newhomes)   13.143252 23.20041  0.32093  0.571 
*   Cr*(newhomes)   -1.942766 1.08055  3.23258  0.0722 
    Fr*(newhomes)   -1.250312 2.12242  0.34704  0.5558 
         
 log L -430.0585       
 **significant at 5% level       
  *significant at 10% level       
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